Hamas terrorists attacking an Israeli kibbutz on October 7, 2023 (Photo: Screenshot).
Israel Defense Forces on Thursday presented the results of a months-long investigation into its military failures that enabled the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre in southern Israel. The report highlighted misjudgments in assessing Hamas in the years leading up to the attack, as well as critical mistakes in the immediate lead-up, during the invasion, and in the response to the invasion.
The investigation revealed that warning signs were ignored, troop levels at the border were insufficient, and command-and-control in the south completely collapsed for several hours.
Approximately 5,000 Hamas-led terrorists and civilians burst out of the Gaza Strip in the morning hours of Oct. 7, 2023, outnumbering the less than 700 IDF fighters present on the border.
The terrorists overran the IDF’s Gaza Division and, for hours, carried out a murder and kidnapping spree, almost unopposed. More than 1,200 people were killed and 251 people, both living and deceased, were taken hostage into Gaza.
In addition to investigations into 40 specific battles, the probe focused on four broader points: the strategic perception of the Gaza threat over the past decade; assessments of intelligence information gathered about Hamas since 2014; performance of intelligence and decision-making leading up to the eve before the invasion; and command-and-control during the defensive battles from Oct. 7 to 10.
The systematic failure in correctly assessing Hamas’ capabilities and intentions began around the time of the 2014 Gaza War, called “Operation Protective Edge.”
Even before 2014, Iran and its primary proxy, Hezbollah, were regarded as the top security priorities by both the military and political leadership, with most resources being allocated to these threats.
Many Israeli observers have since noted that this disparity explains the extreme gap between the IDF’s performances in Gaza and Lebanon, where Hezbollah was effectively decapitated and neutralized within weeks.
“The leading approach from the top, even in the months leading up to the war, was to focus on Iran… to expand the Abraham Accords and preserve the Palestinian Authority’s role,” the investigation stated.
Meanwhile, the situation in Gaza was managed without a clear resolution in mind. Hamas was neither regarded as a potential peace partner nor targeted for military defeat or regime change in the enclave.
An IDF source told Ynet News, “Protective Edge was the moment when the question of whether to defeat Hamas first arose. The IDF was instructed to focus solely on neutralizing the threat of infiltrating tunnels and keeping Hamas in power in Gaza. The success of that operation was measured by how much quiet it brought until the next escalation.”
Israel estimated that Hamas was interested in peace in order to deepen its control over Gaza and build up its governmental capabilities. Therefore, Israel strove to leverage concessions (like allowing tens of thousands of Gazans to work in Israel) believing this would further dissuade Hamas from seeking war.
In the meantime, the IDF believed it could periodically degrade Hamas’ capabilities through its “MABAM,” campaign, a Hebrew acronym meaning “war between the wars.”
This is a strategy of constant pin-prick airstrikes that had somewhat successfully restrained Iranian weapon smuggling to Hezbollah, while avoiding full-scale war.
The short 2021 Gaza War, as well as smaller conflicts in 2022 and 2023, in which the IDF almost exclusively targeted the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terror group, while Hamas didn’t actively take part, further reinforced Israel’s view that Hamas was not interested in war.
Looking back, the IDF acknowledges that Hamas succeeded in deceiving Israel for over a decade, lulling it into complacency.
In addition, Israeli leaders were convinced that its intelligence services, as well as the new high-tech fence and bulwark along the border, would prevent any surprise attacks and provide the IDF enough time to prepare for possible escalations.
“The flawed systemic mindset was that wars would begin with deterioration, not a sudden enemy surprise attack,” according to the investigation.
However, the border fence was built for defending against the periodic riots along the border that, in hindsight, were used by Hamas to probe defenses and collect intelligence.
Although the fence was never designed to prevent large-scale invasions, it nonetheless gave the army a false sense of security, leading to a fatal reduction in troop numbers along the border, particularly on weekends.
According to the IDF’s assessments, a surprise, large-scale invasion of the type Hamas carried out on Oct. 7 was seen as so unrealistic that the military didn’t prepare for it.
After the 2021 war, the IDF also mistakenly believed that airstrikes had destroyed large and important parts of Hamas’ tunnel network, also hampering invasion attempts.
The Israeli military did, however, prepare for rocket fire, which was seen as the main threat from Gaza.
The IDF determined that on Oct. 7, Israel was constrained by a set of entrenched beliefs that prevented an accurate assessment of the situation. These assumptions led the military to misinterpret clear warning signs, even in the early hours of the invasion.
The wrong assessment of Hamas was “rooted and deep,” the Times of Israel quoted from the IDF’s conclusions, and over the years, there were no attempts to reassess and question those beliefs.
Among the recommended lessons, the IDF is advocating for an end to the strategy of “managing” conflicts or seeking temporary quiet. Instead, it emphasized that any significant threat, particularly along the border, should be swiftly and decisively eliminated.
The military should also strive to seek out developing threats and destroy them before they increase in significance.
To achieve this, the IDF must expand its troop numbers, resources, and capabilities to be fully prepared for a potential large-scale war on multiple fronts.
The findings from each phase of the ongoing investigation are first presented to affected communities, bereaved families, and the political leadership before being published on a dedicated IDF website.
